"They suggest that we may confer political equality on the coloured people, without admitting them to social equality…. Now, sir, I submit to the gentlemen, whether these political rights, of which we are speaking, do not depend, for their preservation and right exercise, on social intercourse and equality. Not that every man, must associate with every man in the community, but I hold there must be that free and unrestrained interchange of sentiments on public questions, which can only attend a state of general equality, if we would properly prepare the mass of men to exercise political suffrage.... These separate circles or little societies which wealth or adventitious circumstances, and not our political institutions, have made distinct, have connecting links that extend the opinions thus formed by the contact of minds, from and to the extremities of the body politic, and keep up a sympathy between the whole and all its parts; and here is the foundation of the system of universal suffrage. For suffrage is only the expression of the opinions which are perpetually maturing under the influence of social intercourse and equality."--Woodward, delegate to the Pennsylvania constitutional convention, 1838.I have argued, and continue to, that at least some of the resonance of 'social equality' in the post-bellum period as an obstacle to state intervention in civil rights came about because of it was strategically deployed by racial egalitarians who were attempting to secure rights of political and civil equality (for principled reasons, as well as the huge labor interest once slavery was abolished in ensuring that free blacks would not remain a helot class) against understandings of citizenship and belonging that remained anchored in the white male republic.
The counter, however, is that the opponents of black suffrage and civil rights in the antebellum period had their own sophisticated understanding of the importance of social equality: only under conditions of social equality and intercourse could there be the formation of sympathy with the whole, that the opinions exchanged, developed, and defended in these networks of equal intercourse incrementally structured a broad attachment of these "separate circles or little societies" with a community in formation. Absent this sympathy, it was class warfare, and universal suffrage would be simply a weapon in the hands of the property-less. And absent this sympathy, foreclosed by the lack of social intercourse on a plane of equality, the extension of the suffrage to blacks would have been creating a scenario in which electoral competition became an arena for race war.
Clearly the resonance of concerns over social equality come in part from the fact that both the advocates and opponents of black civil and political rights embraced this discourse, just as it is clearly the case that they embraced it because of its broader resonance. But by looking at the discourse from the perspective of the strategic calculus of racial egalitarians, we miss the nuanced concerns of antebellum white supremacists. And we should listen to these dead activists, however distasteful, because the specific content of these concerns--that suffrage and representative government requires a sympathy for the community, a belief in a common weal, and that these are rooted in patterns of social intercourse that are highly resilient in the face of state intervention--is one that we need to take very seriously.