Parties that oppose popular presidents may be able to benefit even if their own image is damaged -- after all, by definition minority parties are better off if all incumbents suffer. Individual Members of Congress from those minority parties, however, may find themselves more vulnerable to defeat even if their party overall benefits, and therefore they may choose to accommodate, rather than reject, the president's agenda..... The story here is that Republicans in 1993-1994 were able to convince incumbents to carry out a rejectionist strategy, and Republicans won in 1994, so Republicans (and many Democrats) are now convinced that rejectionist strategies are obvious choices. It's not at all clear, however, that Republican strategies in1993-1994 were responsible for Clinton's low approval ratings or the other causes of the Democrats' 1994 electoral debacle. And it's not at all clear to me that the Republican strategy is succeeding now. Barack Obama's approval ratings remain at around 50%, despite historically very high levels of unemployment. Would he be higher if Republicans had allowed his nominations to clear the Senate? Somehow, I doubt it. Higher if health care had passed? That, I can buy -- but I also think health care is still likely to pass, regardless of Republican actions. Meanwhile, Republican incumbents are subject to attacks for opposing locally popular projects, and Democrats will be attacking them on obstructing popular legislation.The only thing missing is a discussion of the role of the different electorate for midterms. Is this a competition between the bases, with less partisan and actual independents less likely to vote? If that's the case then party mobilization seems to be absolutely crucial. Obstructionism, however, could go both ways here: it seems likely to strengthen the minority party, if obstructionism is able to mobilize their base, but it might also strengthen the majority party, if their base becomes even more aggrieved and outraged than they were when they won in the presidential election year.
I suspect, but do not actually have anything to back this up, that the base responds less to the actions of the other party than the actions of their own: if my party is scoring wins, either by passing legislation or by blocking legislation, then I'll be more likely to be motivated. If my party is losing in terms of passing policies (either they can't block things or they can't get things through), my motivation is going to depend very heavily on how my party's leaders behave and whether they are able to generate a convincing narrative that they are losing through some fault not of their own (some losers really make you want to cheer for them even harder--like Rocky 1--while others really just make you sickened at their behavior--my Edmonton Oilers, this year and so many other years in the past).
The nadir for the Democrats was likely the chaos after Scott Brown's election. Not because Brown lost, but because they treated it like a catastrophe that signaled they shouldn't even bother to try to advance their stated priorities. That was enough to demoralize a base incredibly quickly, greatly jeopardizing their chances were that level of demoralization going to last until November.
What I'd like to see before prognosticating on November are (1) Obama's popularity at a more fine-grained level (is his reasonably high popularity, given the economic circumstances, overly concentrated in already safe seats, or is it relatively high even in competitive seats? How much of the disapproval is from Democrats, who might then be less likely to turn out in November), and (2) historical turnout trends for midterms (is it a fight between the bases, or is it a pretty even decrease in turnout amongst all levels of identifiers and independents).
No comments:
Post a Comment